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Introduction 
Michigan's No-Faul t automobile insurance law [No-Faul t] 
made subs tant ia l  changes in the  way persons involved in automobile 
crashes a re  compensated f o r  in ju r i e s  and f o r  damage t o  t h e i r  
property. Under No-Faul t the  1 i t i  gation system, in which compen- 
sa t ion  depends on f a u l t ,  i s  replaced by a s y s t e ~  in which an 
injured person receives insurance benefi ts  without regard t o  f a u l t .  
The General Highw8.y Law and the  Governmental Immunity Law 
[road l i a b i l i t y  lawsj both provide t h a t  road commissions a re  
responsible f o r  in ju r i e s  caused by t h e i r  f a u l t  in f a i l i n g  t o  
provide sa fe  roads. 
This report  will  discuss the  s i tua t ion  in which the No-Fault 
law and the  road 1 i ab i l  i t y  laws i n t e r s e c t ,  t h a t  i s ,  where a 
defect ive road causes a crash which resu l t s  in damage t o  a car  
o r  injury t o  i t s  occupants, and where the  No-Faul t law would other-  
wise apply. The repor t  begins with a discussion of road commission 
l i a b i l i t y  i n  general and the  No-Fault law in general ,  considers 
how No-Faul t a f f e c t s  road commission 1 iab i l  i t y ,  and concludes with 
recommendations regarding possible courses of ac t ion .  
Road Commission Liabil i i v  
The Generai Highway law imposes a duty on road commissions t o  
maintain a l l  roads under t h e i r  ju r i sd ic t ion  in a condition t h a t  i s  
"reasonably safe  and convenient f o r  public t r a v ~ ' "  ( 1 ) .  If a road 
commission f a i l s  in t h i s  duty, then any person injured because of 
the defect ive condition of the highway can sue -Lnc .ommission fo r  
the  resul t ing  personal in ju r i e s  and property damage. Before a 
road commission can be held 1 iab le  f o r  the  defect ive road, however, 
i t  must have had an opportunity t o  repair  the defect  before the 
accident happened. This requirement i s  met when the commission in 
f a c t  knew of the s i tua t ion  pr ior  t o  the time of the accident and 
had reasonable time to  correc t  i t .  However, i f  the s i tua t ion  was 
"readily apparent t o  an ordinar i ly  observant person" f o r  a t  l e a s t  
30 days before the accident ,  Michigan law requir2s courts to  conclude 
tha t  the commission had knowledge of the defect and had ample time 
t o  repai r  i t ,  even though the commission may ac tual ly  h3ve had 
nei ther  ( 2 ) .  
This l i a b i l i t y  i s  based on the concept of negligence. 'Iegligence 
ex i s t s  where a person o r  organization which has a duty t 3  use reasonable 
care f a i l s  t o  do s o ,  the r e s u l t  being injury t o  a person or  to  
property. I n  the case-of a road commission, the duty ( t o  maintain 
the roads) i s  inposed by s t a t u t e .  The commission i s  not re-  
quired t o  guarantee tha t  the roads will  be sa fe ,  b u t  t o  use ordinary 
care to  make them safe .  As will  be seen l a t e r  in the discussion of the 
No-Faul t law, t h i s  duty of care i s  s imilar  t o  the one tha t  appl ies  
to  a l l  drivers  and was the basis f o r  determining who bore the loss  
resul t ina  from an accident.  
I t  has long been the ru le  in Michigan, as in other  s t a t e s ,  
t h a t  the  government and i t s  agencies cannot be sued fo r  negligence. 
The 1 iabi l  i t y  of a road commission f o r  i t s  negligence in maintaining 
the roads has long been an exception t o  t h i s  ru le  of governmental 
immunity ( 3 ) .  When the  Michigan Supreme Court ;ttempted t o  do away 
w i t h  governmental immunity in general , the  1 eg i s l a tu re  enacted a 
s t a t u t e  re-establ ishing i t .  That s t a t u t e ,  however, expressly 
continues the exception which permits a road commission t o  be sued ( 4 )  
Because a s t a t e  cannot be sued without i t s  consent, i t  can impose 
conditions on the r igh t  to  sue where i t  does consent. As to  a road 
comission the 1 ea i s l a tu re  has established two conditions. One of these 
has already been described: the injured person must show that the 
commission knew of the defect and had time t o  repair i t .  The other 
condition i s  t h a t  the injured person must notify the commission of the 
injury and give i t  infornation on the location and nature of the defect, 
the accident, and the injury. The s tatute  requires that this  notice be 
given within 120 days o f  the injury (5), b u t  the courts have held t h a t  
a l a t e r  notice i s  sufficient unless the delay hampers the commission's 
efforts t o  prepare a defence ( 6 ) .  
Except for these two conditions, a road commission remains l iable  
t o  persons injured by i t s  negligence in maintaining the roads under 
i t s  control. This concept of negligence, or fai lure  t o  use care, was 
also the one used t o  assign responsibility for an accident t o  one 
of the drivers i n  the l i t igat ion system. A t  least  in the area of driver 
l i a b i l i t y ,  the use of the negligence theory was changed by the No-Faul t law. 
The 140-Faul t Law 
The law has traditionally determined responsibility for injuries in 
a t r a f f i c  crash on the basis of fau l t .  This was expressed in the concept 
of negligence, the fai lure  t o  use ordinary care in the situation in which 
the accident occurred, Thus, the injured party, in order t o  receive com- 
pensation, was required t o  prove that the "other driver" had been care- 
less.  However, the other driver, even i f  he was negligent, could avoid 
paying the injured party by showing that the injured party was also 
negligent ( 7 ) .  This concern with establ ishing fau l t  often led t o  
numerous and long t r i a l s  and  was t h o u g h t  t o  be a major cause of  court 
congestion. The result  was that a legitimate claim for a large amount 
of money, where the injuries were severe, was l ikely t o  be sett led for 
less than i t  was worth, because the injured party needed the money. On 
the other hand, a small claim could often be sett led for more than i t  
was worth because i t  was cheaper t o  s e t t l e  i t  than t o  pay t o  defend i t .  
Dissatisfaction with the operation of the negligence system led 
t o  the passage of the No-Faul t law in 1972.  This law has been upheld 
by the Michigan Supreme Court (8 ) .  Because the No-Fault law i s  fa i r ly  
recent and compl ex; i t  will be described re la t ive ly  completely 
i n  the r e s t  of t h i s  section.  In general,  i t  can be said t ha t  No-Fault 
changed the focus 3.7 the injury compensation system. Before No-Faul t , 
the focus was on the personal f a u l t  of the d r ive r ,  After No-Faul t 
i t  i s  on the insurer of  the vehicle. 
The No-Fault law eliminated 1 iabi l  i t y  f o r  negl igence and 
replaced i t  with insurance benefits available from the injured 
person's own insurer .  There a r e  two important sxceptions t o  t h i s  
ru le .  L iab i l i ty  fo r  negl igence i s  retained where ( a )  the damages 
fo r  "economic loss"  (wages, expenses, e tc .  ) exceed the amounts 
paid fo r  these losses under the insurance, and ( b )  the injured person 
suffers  "death, c?taio.s impairment of body function or permanent 
serious disfigurement" ( 9 ) .  These exceptions es tabl ish  a "threshold." 
Below the threshold, 1 iabi l  i t y  for  ne;l igence i s  abol ished. Above 
the threshold, I ~ w s u i t s  fo r  damages based on f a u l t  a re  s t i l l  permitted. 
Therefore, i t  i s  c lea r  t ha t  the No-Fault law i s  i n t s d e d ,  not t o  
abolish 1 i a b i l i t y  i u r  negligence a l together .  b u t  to  1 imit i t  t o  the 
more serious cases. I t  follows that  i f  i t  does apply t o  s u i t s  
against the Commission, No-Faul t w i l l  el iminate only the l esse r  
ones, and not those where the in ju r ies  a re  seriolls. 
No-Faul t chanoed the focus of the compensation system t o  
insurance of one's own vehicle rather than the conduct of the other 
dr iver .  Insurance i s  mandatory under No-Fault. In order t o  r eg i s te r  
a motor vehicle in l~lichigan, i t s  owner must present proof of insurance 
(o r  be an approved sel f - insurer)  ( 10 ) .  Three types of insurance are  
required: person21 in jury ,  property damage, and "residual 1 iabi l  i t y .  " 
Residual 1 iabi l  i ty insurance covers accidents occurring out of s t a t e ,  
b u t  more important, i t  covers cases where the driver covered by the 
policy i s  a t  f au l t  and the in ju r ies  a re  above the threshold. These 
a re  the cases where claims against  the negligent driver a re  s t i l l  
permitted by Yo-Fault. Personal injury and property damage coverage 
are  discussed below. 
No-Faul t ' s  personal injury provisions make 'he insurers of 
owners and operators of  motor vehicles responsible for  "economic" 
1 osses suffered by the occupants of the i r  vehicle ( 1  1 ) , Persona1 
injury insurance covers these 1 osses. Economic losses include 
los t  wages, loss of support, and out-of-pocket expenses. Out-of- 
pocket expenses include the cost of suppl ies , services, a n d  accormodations 
during treatment and recovery. Lost wages are limited t o  the f i r s t  
three years a f t e r  an accident ( 1 2 ) .  As l o n g  as a person's injuries 
are below the No-Faul t threshold, he i s  n o t  permitted t o  sue for  
damages. B u t  i f  the losses exceed the No-Faul t benefits, or i f  the 
injur ies  involve death, serious impairment of  body function, or 
permanent serious disfigurement , then the injured person i s  above 
the thresh01 d and can sue for damages based on negl igence, 
Within the 1 imits of No-Faul t coverage, however, financial 
responsibility for an accident i s  on the insurer of the owner or 
operator of the vehicle occupied by the injured person. Thus, 
the personal injury protection carried by the vehicle ( i . e . ,  by 
i t s  owner) appl ies t o  a1 1 the occupants of the vehicle. This 
protection applies whether the vehicle i s  privately owned or i s  
owned by a company and driven by an employee. -herefore, if the 
owner of the v?kicle i s  driving i t  and he and a passenger are 
injured, they both receive compensation from the owner's insurer. 
If the vehicle i s  uninsured, then the occupants are compensated by 
the insurer of that  vehicle 's  driver.  If neither the owner nor the 
driver i s  insured, then the occupants look t o  the insurance on 
the i r  own vehicles (13) .  
No-Faul t I s  property damage provisions make the insurers of 
owners and operators of  motor vehicles responsible for  the cost 
of accidental damage t o  physical property "arising o u t  of" the use of 
such vehicles in Michigan ( 1 4 ) .  Covered damages include loss of use 
of property b u t  are limited t o  the lesser of repair or depreciated 
replacement cost.  The maximum l i a b i l i t y  of an ir~surer in any single 
accident i s  l imited t o  one mil l ion d o l l a r s .  No-Fault property 
damage benefi ts  will  not pay f o r  damage t o  the motor vehicle i t s e l f  
unless,  a t  the time of the accident ,  i t  was properly parked and 
was struck by another vehicle (15) .  Insurance f o r  damage t o  one 's  
own vehicle can be obtained by purchasing a separate "coll  is ion 
r i d e r , "  usual ly  with a "deducti b l  e" provision, whereby the insured 
pays a cer ta in  amount and the insurer  pays the excess. These r ide r s  
typica l ly  waive the deductible i f  the dr iver  was not a t  f a u l t  in 
the  accident .  However, col 1 i s  ion r iders  a re  not mandatory under 
No-Fault. They a re  options avai lable  t o  those who want t h i s  
protection in exchange fo r  additional premiums. The extent of the 
col l  is ion coverage i s  a contractual matter between the insurance 
company and the vehicle owner and i s  spelled out in the  insurance 
pol icy . 
In summary, the  following fac tors  a r e  relevant in evaluating 
the impact of No-Fault on a road commission's l i a b i l i t y  f o r  defect ive 
highway maintenance: 
0 F i r s t ,  the  General Highway Law makes a road commission l i a b l e  
f o r  damages caused by i t s  f a i l u r e  t o  maintain the highways 
under i t s  control in a condition sa fe  fo r  use by the  motor- 
ing public 
0 Second, the  Governmental Immunity Law allows s u i t s  against  
a road conn~ission when i t  f a i l s  to  correc t  a defect which 
i t  knows o r  si10~1d know o f ,  so long as the injured person 
gives timely notice of the injury 
0 Third, No-Fault l imi t s  s u i t s  fo r  damages "ar is ing  out o f "  
the  operation of motor vehicles in Michigan to  the more 
serious cases 
The e f fec t  of the $10-Faul t law on road commission 1 iabi . l i ty  fo r  
defect ive roads i s  discussed in the next s e c t i o ~ .  
The Effect of the .--- ?lo-Fault Law on Road Commission Liabili ty 
The General !-:i?hway Law and Governmental I~munity Law both imposz 
1 iabil  i ty on a road commission when i t s  negligence in constructing or 
maintaining the highways causes damage or injury t o  an automobile or 
i t s  occupants. On the other hand, the No-Fault law abolishes 
l i a b i l i t y  for nqligence arising out of the use of an automobile 
except where the injuries are serious enough t o  be above the threshold. 
Thus these laws appear t o  be in confl ic t .  This section discusses that  
conflict  and possible resolutions of i t .  
Two points should be made a t  the outset.  F i r s t ,  even i f  No-Faul t 
does apply to claims by injured persons against road commissions, i t  
does n o t  ent i rely bar them; rather ,  No-Fault would s t i l l  permit such 
claims where the claimed injur ies  are above the threshold (15).  Second, 
an authoritative resolution of the conflict  between the s tatutes  can 
only come from the legis lature  i t s e l f ,  or from an interpretation of 
the s tatutes  by the courts. A t  present, there are no decisions from 
the Michigan courts on th i s  question. Therefore i t  i s  necessary to  
examine the s tatutes  themselves, and the leq is la ture ' s  intent in 
enacting them. 
Read 1 i teral  ly and by i t s e l f ,  No-Faul t appear: t o  bar su i t s  
against road commissions for in juries or property damage caused by 
defective highway maintenance, since a l l  such injuries a r i se  o u t  
of the use of motor vehicles in Michigan, 
The No-Faul t i aw reads i n  part ( 1 6 )  : 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, t o r t  1 iabil i t v  
arising from the ownership, maintenance or use within th is  
s t a t e  of a motor vehicle.. . i s  abolished [.I 
The Supreme Court has cxplained the leg is la ture ' s  intent in 
enacting the personal injury portion of the No-Fsult law ( 1 7 ) .  I t  
stated that the legislature sought: 
e to end the delays in settling claims that were common under 
the negl igence system, 
e to reduce pressure on injured parties to take less than their 
claims were worth, and 
e to lessen the number of motor-vehicle accidents 1 itigated 
in court. 
The Court also summarized the purposes of the property damage 
provisions of the No-Fault Law. In this regard the legislature sought: 
e to create safer cars by keying premium costs to repair costs 
of the insured's car and so promote development of more 
crash worthy cars, 
e to el iminate accident investigations, thereby 1 owering premiums 
by reducing administrative costs, and 
e to make group insurance feasible and so reduce premium costs 
because of its relatively lower administrative costs. 
All of these stated rationales would apply to suits by drivers against a 
road commi~sioi~, and therefore support the concl us ion that No-Faul t 
bars suits against road commissions for defectivs highway maintenance. 
The nature and strength of these purposes must be weighed 
against the purpose of the road 1 iabil ity laws, which impose 
liability on road commissions. The purpose of the liability 
provisions in the General Highway Law and the Governmental Immunity 
Law is twofold: to provide an incentive to road commissions to be 
diligent in carrying out their responsibility to provide safe 
roads; and to provide a means for compensating anyone injured by 
a road commission's failure to do so. 
The No-Faul t law 1 imits 1 iabil ity for negligence to cases 
involving serious injury. The road 1 iabil ity laws establish 
1 iabi 1 ity for negl igence against road commissions. The purpose of 
No-Fault is to provide a fairer and swifter systerii of compensation 
by el iminating the expense and delay of 1 itigation. The purpose of 
the road 1 iabi 1 i t y  laws i s  t o  provide a means of compensating persons 
injured because of defective roads and t o  provide an incentive t o  road 
commissions t o  provide safer roads (18).  
A court that t r i e s  t o  resolve the conflict  between these laws will 
l ikely base i t s  decisions on the intent of the legislature in enacting 
the s tatutes .  I n  addition t o  referring t o  the language used in the acts,  
the court will use some general principles of interpretation which 
apply whenever s ta tutes  seem t o  be in conflict .  The following discussion 
describes the reasoning that a court might follow and summarizes the 
results a court m i g h t  reach. 
There are several reasons which support the conclusion that 
No-Fault bars claims for negligence against a road commission. As was 
stated above, No-Fault's purpose i s  t o  create a fa i re r  compensation 
system by substituting insurance for negligence 1 iabil i ty .  Since 
the use of l i t igat ion t o  determine faul t  i s  an expensive a n d  time-con- 
suming in a defective-road case as in any other case, lo-Faul t ' s  benefits 
should apply in those cases and the Commission should n o t  be l iable.  
The very specific language in the No-Fault act also supports 
this conclusion. As stated ea r l i e r ,  the act provides that: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, t o r t  1 iabi 1 i t y  
arising from the ownership, maintenance or use within this  
s t a t e  of a motor vehicle...is abolished [ . I  
These words would appear t o  include any injury or damage t o  a vehicle 
caused by the roadway, since the use of the vehicle was a factor in 
the crash. 
Finally, i f  No-Fault does conflict  with the road l i a b i l i t y  
laws, i t  can be argued that i t  has priority because i t  i s  the more 
recent s ta tu te ,  and when two statutes deal with the same area and 
are in confl ic t ,  the more recent one ordinarily takes precedence ( 1 9 ) .  
While the arguments in favor of lo-Fault 's limiting road commission 
1 iabil i t y  are substantial , there are a1 so sutjstantial arguments for 
the opposite conclusion, 
The f i r s t  o f  these i s  the strength of the pol icy, underlying 
the road l i a b i l i t y  s ta tu tes ,  that road commissions be held responsible 
for damage caused by their  fa i lure  t o  exercise care in making the 
roads safe for  travel.  This principle i s  n o t  a new one. I t  has been 
recognized for a t  least  a century ( 2 0 ) .  I t s  strenath i s  reflected 
n o t  on ly  in the fact  that i t  has continued to exis t  for so l o n g  b u t  
also in that i t  was never questioned during a recent dispute between 
the Michigan Supreme Court and the 1 egislature over governmental 
immunity. The Supreme Court twice issued opinions which reduced the 
scope of s t a t e  and local governments' immunity from 1 iabil i t y  ( 2 1 ) .  T b ?  
legislature twice responded with statutes which re-established that  
immunity ( 2 2 ) .  However, neither of those statutes changed the rule 
that road commissions were responsible for fai lure  t o  use care in 
keeping the roads safe. Thus, the 1 egis1 ature never contemplated 
immunity for road commissions . 
Moreover, in a recent case where a road commission attempted to  
use another s ta tute  t o  reduce i t s  general l i a b i l i t y  t o  maintain safe 
roads, the Michigan Supreme Court nonetheless found the commission 
l iable .  I n  Mul l  ins v .  Wayne County (23) ,  the road commission was 
charged with neqligence under the General Highway Law for fai lure  t o  
erect a sign indicating the end of  a road a t  a T-intersection. The 
commission raised as a defense that i t s  fa i lure  t o  erect a sign was 
just i f ied by the Uniform Traffic Signal Control Statute ( 2 4 ) ,  which 
gave the commission discretion as t o  erecting signs. The court 
rejected that argument, stating that the road commission could n o t  
use the more lenient s ta tu te  "as a shield t o  i t s  statutory l i ab i l i t y  
for construction of  an unsafe road." While the 1!3llins case does not -- 
deal with the effect of the No-Fault law, i t  does i l l u s t r a t e  the 
importance that the court attaches to  a road commission's statutory 
obi igation to provide safe roads, even where another s ta tute  apparently 
reduces that 1 iabil i t y .  
Second, i f  the No-Fault law does l imit  road commissicn l i a b i l i t y  for 
defective roads, then No-Faul t is, in e f f ec t ,  a partial repeal o f  the 
s ta tutes  which establish that  1 iabil i t y .  However, when the legislature 
enacts a s ta tu te  which repeals or modifies an ear l ie r  one, the 
repealing s ta tu te  generally names the affected s ta tu te  expl i c i t l y .  IS 
t h i s  were not done, i t  would become very d i f f i cu l t  t o  t e l l  which laws 
were currently in force. I t  sometimes happens that a more recent 
s ta tu te  will repeal or modify an ear l ie r  one "by implication." This repeal 
happens when the appl ication of the newer s tatute  necessarily confl i c t s  
with the ea r l i e r  one. Such repeals are possible, b u t  as the Supreme 
Court in Mullins saici, i t  i s  "a well-established principle that  repeals 
by imp1 icat  ion are not favored. " 
A court taking th i s  approach might also rely u p o n  the language 
in the No-Fault act  1 imiting i t s  application - t o  injuries and 
damage "arising o u t  of the ... use of a motor vehicle." This language 
could be interpreted t o  mean that only crashes caused by the operation 
of a vehicle are within the scope of No-Faul t. When an accident i s  
claimed t o  be caused by defective highway maintenance, i t  could be 
said that  the accident arose o u t  of the defect rather than the 
operation of the vehicle. 
Finally, a court facing the question of whether the No-Faul t 
law 1 imited road commission 1 iabil i ty  would a1 so consider the relat ive 
breadth of  the laws. The No-Fault law covers the ent i re  f ie ld  
of injuries arising o u t  of motor vehicle use. The road 
1 i ab i l i t y  laws deal with only a part of that f i e l d ,  namely, injuries 
caused by defective roads. I t  i s  a general rule that where two 
statutes  apply t o  the same si tuat ion,  b u t  one applies specifically 
while the other applies in general terms which cover other si tuations 
as well, the more specific s ta tu te  will take p r ~ e d e n c e  over the 
more general ( 2 5 ) .  Since the road 1 iabil i t y  s ta tutes  are quite 
specific,  t h i s  rule would support the conclusion that the No-Fault 
law does n o t  l imit  a road commission's l i a b i l i t y  for defective roads. 
I t  i s  clear that arguments can be made for and against the appl ication 
of No-Fault to  l imit  road commission 1 iabil i t y .  3ased on th i s  
analysis, there appear t o  be three possible resul ts .  
F i r s t ,  a court might decide that the No-Fault law takes 
precedence over the road l i a b i l i t y  laws and therefore l imits claims 
against a road commission t o  those permitted by No-Faul t. The 
resul t  of th is  would be that  the commission would be l iab le  only 
where the injuries were above the threshold, as defined by the 
No-Faul t law. 
Second, a court might reach the opposite concl~!sion and hold 
that  the No-Faul t law does not apply a t  a l l  where the road commission's 
fa i lure  t o  provide safe roads was the cause of injury. This would 
mean that an injured person would not be covered by No-Fault benefits 
and that  he couid seek compensation only from the commission, by 
way of l i t iga t ion  t o  establish that the commission was a t  fau l t .  
There i s  a third possibil i ty as we1 1 .  A court could decide 
that both No-Fault and the road l i a b i l i t y  laws apply. This approach 
would permit an injured person t o  seek compensation from both the 
insurer and the road commission. 
Because there are  substantial arguments t o  support any of 
these decisions, i t  cannot be stated with certainty which approach 
a court would in fac t  take. The next section suggests methods of 
resolving th is  problem. 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
The legis lat ive purpose behind the No-Fault law i s  c lear ,  as 
i s  the purpose behind the General Highway Law and Governmental 
Immunity Law. However, i t  i s  not clear which of these laws would take 
precedence i f  a road commission were t o  ra ise  the No-Fault law as 
a defense in a su i t  alleging that i t  was l iab le  for maintaining 
defective roads. The No-Fault law seeks t o  provide f a i r e r  a n d  swifter 
compensation for injured persons, I t  does th is  by eliminating 
l i a b i l i t y  for negligence where the injuries are not serious, 
thereby el iminating the delay and expense of 1 artcui t s  t o  determine 
fau l t .  On the other hand, the General Highway Law and Governmental 
Immunity Law express a continuing pol icy of holdin? road commissions 
l iab le  for  a l l  damages caused by their  fa i lure  to keep the roads 
in good repair and safe for public use. The relationship between 
these pol icies can be determined only by a decision of the courts, 
or by the legis lature  i t s e l f .  
There are three possible approaches which the Commission might 
take t o  obtain such a resolution: 
a The Commission could raise  No-Fault as a defense in a 
t r i a l  in which i t  i s  sued for damages. 
a The Commission could bring a declaratory judgment action, 
asking a court specifically to determine the effect  o f  
No-Faul t ,  
a The Commission could ask the legis lature  to resolve the 
issue by enacting an amendment clarifying the law. 
Each of these approaches has advantages and disadvantages which should 
be weighed before deciding on any course of action, 
I f  the Commission i s  sued by a person whose damages are below 
the No-Faul t threshold or are for  property damage only, i t  could 
raise  No-Fault as a defense i n  the t r i a l .  The t r i a l  judge would 
then be required t o  decide whether No-Fault l imits road commission 
l i a b i l i t y .  The t r i a l  judge's decision could be appealed t o  the 
Michigan Court cri Appeals and probably t o  the Michigan Supreme Court. 
A final ruling from the Michigan courts would resolve the issue as 
t o  present law. However, the legislature could, i f  i t  chose t o  do 
so, change the law as determined by the courts by enacting a new 
s ta tu te  to  amend No-Fault or one of the road 1 iabil i t y  laws, 
The Commission might also seek a resolutioii from the courts 
by way of a "declaratory judgment" act ion.  This i s  a  form of 
lawsuit ,  and i s  l ike  the f i r s t  approach in that  i t  f s  begun in the 
t r i a l  court and the t r i a l  judge's decision can be appealed. The 
resu l t  of t h i s  approach would also be a resolution of the issue 
under present law, subject t o  the power of the l eg i s la tu re  t o  
change the law. There i s  also a s ignif icant  difference between the 
declaratory judgment approach and the f i r s t  approach. A declaratory 
judgment action asks only tha t  the court "declare" the law i n  a  
cer ta in  area. I t  i s  not based on a speci f ic  accident o r  in jury ,  and 
does not ask the court t o  determine who was a t  f a u l t  and how much 
compensation should be paid. Therefore, the  declaratory judgment 
approach would permit the speci f ic  question of the e f fec t  of No-Fault 
on commission l i a b i l i t y  t o  be raised and decided without considering 
other issues tha t  are  part  of an ordinary lawsuit,  
An additional advantage of the declaratory judgment approach i s  
tha t  i t  permits the  conmission t o  begin the proceedings a t  a  time 
of i t s  choosing, ra ther  than as part  of a defense t o  a claim brought 
by someone e l s e .  
Both of these approaches o f fe r  the opportunity to  obtain a 
speci f ic  answer to  the question ra ised,  since i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  f o r  
a court to  avoid answering a question tha t  i s  properly brought 
before i t ,  The l eg i s la tu re ,  on the other hand, cannot be required t o  
enact a  law, There a r e ,  however, s ignif icant  advantages to the 
l eg i s la t ive  approach. 
The th i rd  way t o  determine the e f fec t  of the No-Faul t law on 
road commission l i a b i l i t y  i s  t o  ask the l eg i s la tu re  i t s e l f  to  resolve 
the issue by amending one of the ac t s .  This approach has several 
advantages. F i r s t ,  since the question involves the interpretat ion 
of s t a tu tes  enacted by the l eg i s la tu re ,  the l eg i s la tu re  i t s e l f  i s  
the f inal  authori ty,  I t s  decision,  expressed in ~?n amendment to one of 
the s ta tu tes ,  would be binding on the courts and would, in e f fec t ,  
"overrul e" any inconsistent court decision, Closely related t o  
t h i s  i s  the possibil i ty that any court decision which might resul t  
from the f i r s t  two approaches would ultimately be "reviewed" by 
the legis lature ,  i f  those w h o  disagreed with the court decision 
sought a statutory amendment t o  override i t .  
Additional advantages are based on the nature of the legis lat ive 
process. While a court makes i t s  decisions in seclusion af te r  
hearing the arguments of a l l  par t ies ,  the legislature operates more 
openly in moving a bi l l  through the various stages t o  enactment intc 
law. I t  i s  thewfore possible t o  discuss propos2d legislation with 
any member of the legis lature  a t  any time, This can provide two 
benefits. F i rs t ,  i t  may be possible to determine the legis lat ive 
sentiment toward a proposed b i l l  before i t  i s  introduced. Second, i t  
i s  easier t o  monitor and perhaps influence the legis lat ive process 
so as t o  maximize the prospect of a favorable resu l t ,  
Considering the re1 a t i  ve advantages and disadvantages of the 
three possible approaches, the legis lat ive approach appears t o  be 
preferable. The legis lature  i s  the final authority where the meaning 
of a s ta tu te  i s  in question, and the more open nature of the legis lat ive 
process may make i t  easier t o  estimate the likelihood of ,  and t o  
bring about, a favorable resul t .  I n  addition, i f  the legislature 
failed t o  ac t ,  the f i r s t  two approaches would s t ' l l  be available. 
Each of the three possible approaches presents the possibil i  ty 
of an unfavorable decision as well as a favorable one. I n  considering 
whether t o  seek a determination, and i f  so, which course t o  choose, 
the Cornmission should weigh the advantages of each and the probability 
of  a favorable rcsul t .  Since th i s  weighing process i s  a matter of 
judgment, any decision of the Commission should b? made only af te r  
consul ation with i t s  counsel . 
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